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The China Syndrome: The 
International Trade Commission’s  
Rising Importance For Enforcing 
International Trade Secret Violations
By Jonathan R.K. Stroud
Similarly, our modern business world grows exponen-
tially more interconnected with the Chinese business world 
with each new entrant onto the World Wide Web. Business 
relationships multiply exponentially, and so do the oppor-
tunities for malfeasance.
To ask a trick question: What do the names Yu Xiang 
Dong,2 Hong Meng,3 Shanshan Du,4 Kexue Huang,5 David 
Yen Lee,6 and Hanjuan Jin7 have in common? hey are all 
Chinese, but that is not the deeper answer. Tellingly, all 
six of these individuals igure prominently in President 
Barak Obama’s new strategy on mitigating the thet of U.S. 
trade secrets, appearing as six of the seven examples in the 
recently released strategic report, complete with price tags 
attached to how valuable the misappropriated trade secrets 
were or would have been.8 While not mentioning China 
speciically, the message is manifest—the Administration 
T
he Chinese have a saying that, roughly translated, 
means “four faces, eight places.”1 While the meaning 
is difficult to translate, it effectively means everything 
is connected in all directions. Under one interpretation for 
every line of communication, you have two points on a grid, 
and thus with each new user, your web is multiplied. Thus, 
four faces, eight directions, and (under a strained interpreta-
tion) exponential growth.
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believes the Chinese thet of trade 
secrets is on the rise, and is ramping up 
eforts to address the perceived surge. 
Enter the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC). he ITC has become 
an increasingly popular forum for busi-
ness litigators in recent years.9 With se-
vere remedies against importers of goods 
and a theoretical one-year-turnaround 
time,10 it has several advantages—both 
procedural and substantive—than make 
it an attractive forum for important busi-
ness-to-business intellectual property 
disputes. Commentators and litigators 
oten overlook the ITC’s broad man-
date, however, focusing only on patent 
infringement claims, which are governed 
by subsection (a)(B).11 Indeed, nearly the 
entire ITC’s docket dating back to the 
renaming of the Commission in 1974 
consists of patent-centric litigation.
Yet the governing statute—and thus 
the forum itself—is far broader than 
just subsection (a)(B).12 It “stops parties 
engaging in unfair competition from 
importing into the U.S. It includes both 
statutory IP like patents, copyrights, 
and trademarks—as well as state-law-
based IP—such as trade secrets. When  a 
foreign company practices what would 
be an unfair violation under U.S. , not 
the company’s domestic laws, the U.S. 
Congress excludes that company’s goods 
from the U.S.”13
hus “unfair acts” that “destroy 
or substantially injure” an “industry 
in the United States lead to exclu-
sion.”14 Unlike subsections (a)(B)–(E) 
(trademarks, patents, trade dress, 
copyrights), subsection (A) touches all 
other federal and state-based “unfair 
acts” and does not require the same 
level of proof that the complainant is 
a “domestic industry.”15 his draws 
criticism from international free 
trade advocates16 and allows for a far 
broader exclusion order of all prod-
ucts that have beneitted from any 
alleged trade secret misappropriation. 
Litigants seeking to protect the U.S. 
against unfair importation of ge-
neric versions of patented medicines, 
biologics, and medical devices should 
consider the forum when dealing with 
international parties and pirated intel-
lectual property. 
Background
A. The International Trade 
Commission 
he ITC is an independent, quasi-
judicial federal agency with broad 
investigative responsibilities on matters 
of trade.17 here are six commissioners, 
with no more than three Democrats or 
Republicans, although there have been 
independents in the past.18 Commis-
sioners are appointed to a nine-year 
term by the President as approved by 
the Senate.19
As others have noted,20 section 
337 parallels section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act,21 and broad-
ly declares unlawful unfair methods 
of competition and unfair acts in the 
importation and/or sale of imported 
articles. The ITC administers section 
337. In running Intellectual Proper-
ty-Based Import Investigations (337 
investigations), the USITC employs 
six full-time administrative law 
judges to preside over these trial-like 
proceedings. 
B. The Law of Trade Secrets 
at the ITC
he International Trade Commission 
has stated unequivocally that “there 
is no question that misappropriation 
of trade secrets, if established, is an 
unfair method of competition or unfair 
act which falls within the purview of 
Section 337.”22 To support this discus-
sion, it is important to delve into the 
historical and legal underpinnings of 
trade secret doctrine. 
Trade secret law emanates from a 
provision of Roman law that sought 
to protect information Roman slaves 
might disclose to competitors.23 “he 
law governing protection of trade se-
crets essentially is designed to regulate 
unfair business competition.”24 he tort 
of misappropriation of trade secrets 
seeks to provide a remedy for acts of 
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Compare the ITC’s tracking of total 337 investigations:
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unfair competition against companies 
acting in good faith, and balances the 
rights of the employer to the fruits 
of his capital investment with the 
interests of the laborer in mobility and 
retention of personal skills.25
C. ITC Trade Secret Cases 
By my count, there have been 39 
instituted investigations that have 
formally included Trade Secret in the 
complaint. Of those cases, only a hand-
ful did not settle and only a tiny subset 
of those decided signiicantly comment 
on the law of ITC trade secret viola-
tions. Only a handful primarily pled 
trade secrets violations (although that 
number rose dramatically early this 
year), and due to the primacy of patent 
violations few rulings have survived 
settlement, consent order, or dismissal. 
hus, the record and precedential body 
for ITC trade secret law (and the result-
ing literature) is quite sparse. 
he signiicant cases and some sta-
tistics breaking down any discernible 
trends follow. 
As practitioners rediscover this 
underutilized cause of action, that 
number may grow in the coming 
years, particularly ater the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Tianrui ixed a 
spotlight on the cause of action, argu-
ably expanding the jurisdiction for the 
action to include violations that occur 
entirely outside of the United States.
D. TianRui Grp. Co. v. U.S. 
International Trade 
Commission
Recently, the Federal Circuit made 
waves when it upheld the Commis-
sion’s decision to exclude goods 
based on a trade secret violation, 
where the theft happened in China.28 
There, Amsted Industries—an 
American manufacturer of cast steel 
railway wheels—licensed a discon-
tinued secret process to a Chinese 
foundry. Amsted also developed and 
used its own newer process domesti-
cally. Meanwhile, a Chinese manu-
facturer, TianRui Group Co. Ltd. 
and TianRui Group Foundry Co. 
Ltd. (collectively, TianRui), hired a 
number of employees from the li-
censed foundry and shortly thereaf-
ter produced wheels using the same 
method originally licensed, violating 
U.S. domestic trade secret protec-
tion. TainRui then sought to import 
those wheels into the U.S. The ITC 
excluded those wheels, and the Fed-
eral Circuit upheld the exclusion.
TianRui appropriately recognized the 
ITC’s charter to seek out unfair trade 
practices and protect those American 
industries afected by them. Amsted’s 
licensing of a competing trade secret to 
a foreign corporation provided ample 
evidence establishing a domestic indus-
try—one that was undeniably injured 
domestically by the misappropriation of 
a valuable trade secret that allowed Tian-
Rui to compete in the domestic market. 
 he parties did not dispute that 
the acts of misappropriation occurred 
entirely in China. Following a trial 
before an administrative law judge, 
the Commission ultimately found 
that TianRui violated section 337 and 
issued exclusion and cease and desist 
orders barring the subject TianRui 
wheel parts from entry in to the U.S.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit af-
irmed the Commission’s determina-
tion. he majority found that Section 
337 focuses on the nexus between 
the imported articles and the un-
fair methods of competition rather 
than on where the misappropriation 
occurs: the determination of misap-
propriation was merely a predicate to 
the charge that TianRui committed 
unfair acts in importing its wheels 
into the United States. In other words, 
the Commission’s interpretation of 
section 337 does not, as the dissent 
contends, give it the authority to “po-
lice Chinese business practices.”29 It 
only sets the conditions under which 
products may be imported into the 
United States.
E. Rubber Resins
he ITC has instituted four solely 
trade-secrets-focused investigations 
since the 2011 Federal Circuit decision 
in TianRui. he irst, iled less than 8 
Number of 337 Trade Secret Investigations 
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months later, was Rubber Resins and 
Processes for Manufacturing Same.30 
he complainant SI Group, Inc., a 
chemical rubber tackiier manufactur-
er, iled against multiple respondents 
from China, Hong Kong, and Canada 
(collectively, Sino Legend).31
here, SI Group, Inc. accuses Sino 
Legend of hiring away one of SI 
Group’s plant managers from one of 
SI’s wholly-owned Chinese subsidiar-
ies. hat manager, SI Group alleges, 
misappropriated and disclosed some 
of SI Group’s chemical processes, 
which were trade secrets, to Sino 
Legend. he alleged misappropriation, 
occurring entirely within a foreign ju-
risdiction, was of a chemical formula 
to create superior rubber tackiiers, a 
substance important in tire produc-
tion.32 he 60-page complaint includes 
facts stretching back to 2004.33 On 
June 20, 2012, the Commission, insti-
tuted an investigation. Discovery is 
ongoing and the trial should begin in 
February 2012.
Additionally, the two cases iled in 
2013, Robotic Toys and Components 
hereof and Paper Shredders, Certain 
Processes for Manufacturing or Related 
to Same represent a trend of ilings 
directed toward Chinese companies 
based on trade secret violations. 
F. Discovery Advantages/
Disadvantages
Trade secret litigation at the ITC is 
high-risk, high-reward. It is high risk 
mostly because litigators have been 
reticent prior to TianRui to bring a 
case solely on a trade secret violation 
(or even in addition to an underlying 
patent claim, for that matter), and so 
the law is uncertain and there is little 
precedential opinion to follow. And 
trade secret litigation is high-reward 
because, as many commentators have 
said, it provides a “powerful remedy 
against misappropriation.”34
Despite the relative discomfort 
litigators have shown for doing so, 
pursuing trade secret violations at 
the ITC can be the far wiser litigation 
choice for companies, because it can 
do a number of things normal state 
court trade secret litigation cannot. 
A successful ITC determination oten 
results in a prospective nationwide 
exclusion order, severely limiting the 
usefulness of any trade secrets misap-
propriated by foreign companies by 
denying them access to the largest 
market in the world for their ill-gotten 
goods. With experienced and efective 
counsel arguing the case, exclusion 
orders can encompass even products 
that do not directly incorporate the 
trade secret misappropriated abroad. 
The ITC also affords a number of 
procedural and substantive advan-
tages that should make the ITC a 
more attractive forum for parties 
seeking to protect business and trade 
secret investment. Lastly, even inter-
domestic parties should consider the 
ITC as against U.S.-based competitors 
who still largely import their goods 
from abroad. 
First, TianRui ills a gap in inter-
national enforcement. As many have 
commented, dealing with foreign 
defendants can be diicult because of 
a wide array of procedural, substan-
tive, and practical problems. For 
one, service of process can be nearly 
impossible, even under the Hague 
Convention (to which, for instance, 
Taiwan is not a party). For another, 
there can be little practical efect for 
summons or motions to compel. It 
may be diicult to obtain discovery, 
and costly as well. And even if a client 
is successful, the foreign jurisdiction 
may ultimately refuse to enforce any 
resulting U.S.-based order.35 hus, it 
may be impossible to reach a foreign 
bad actor at all using traditional 
forums. And substantively, if the acts 
occurred abroad, the above-men-
tioned “presumption against extra-
territorial application” as well as the 
machinations of civil procedure may 
render the claim moot. Now, those 
businesses with a colorable claim to 
trade secret violations and industrial 
espionage occurring internationally 
can seek the powerful remedy of do-
mestic exclusion of the product.36 
Tianrui also set the bar low in 
terms of establishing domestic in-
dustry for trade secret violations. In 
TianRui the mere fact of importing 
wheels that would compete with the 
complainants primary business—not 
with the exact product in question—
was suicient to establish the nexus 
required. hus, domestic industry 
seems easier to prove on substance for 
trade secret violations than for patent 
infringement. 
To be sure, the party still has to 
prove a nexus between the product 
and the substantial injury, but with 
Tianrui the ITC seemed to be relaxing 
this requirement, meaning only that 
there is some domestic industry of the 
complainant that will be harmed by 
the importation of the good that has 
beneited from the misappropriation 
abroad. hus, the nexus requirement 
seems a tenuous limitation at best. 
Parties considering the ITC should 
not enter into actions lightly. Tri-
als, while fast, are costly, requiring 
thousands of billable hours to prepare 
and submit mountains of discovery 
requests, responses, and exhibits. Par-
ties generally work non-stop during 
the year-to-year-and-a-half window 
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they have, attempting to prove their 
cases successfully.
Still, highly skilled counsel will 
generally be worth the investment, 
as a successful case could turn 
a trade secret violation into the 
right to exclude products from the 
U.S. market entirely. At the least it 
provides a new bargaining chip to 
desperate parties attempting to en-
force intellectual property violations 
within Chinese borders. 
Conclusion
As shown above, substantively and 
procedurally, the ITC affords a num-
ber of distinct advantages over dis-
trict and state court litigation when it 
comes to trade secret violations. The 
ability to turn a backward-looking 
tort for damages into a forward-
looking right to exclude nationwide 
(including, perhaps, downstream 
products) means that parties can, in 
the future, protect product lines and 
intellectual property indefinitely as a 
trade secret, and then seek to exclude 
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